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ISSUE 
The issue which is raised by this appeal is: 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied 
Appellant's motions for dismissal, for a new trial, and to set 
aside judgment on the grounds of mistake, surprise, inadvertence, 
excusable neglect and other grounds justifying relief? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case on appeal involves non-payment on a Note which was 
signed by Ivan Carlson, as Secretary of De Arte, Inc., a Utah 
corporation. The Complaint was filed in the court below on the 
5th day of February, 1982. (TR:1) The case came on for hearing 
before the Honorable Judge Sam, on May 24, 1984. Judgment was 
entered for Respondent on December 7, 198 4. On or about February 
27, 1985, Appellant filed motions to dismiss all prior actions, 
to set aside judgment as to Defendant Garry Smith, and for 
retrial. These motions were denied on March 21, 1985. Having 
been denied a new trial, Appellant now comes before this court on 
appeal. 
FACTS 
Ivan Carlson, Lyn Kimball, and this Appellant Garry Smith, 
were named as Defendants in Respondent's Complaint filed in the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County on February 5, 
1982. The basis for the Complaint was suit on a Note signed by 
Defendant Ivan Carlson as Secretary of DeArte, Inc. The 
Complaint alleged that Ivan Carlson acted as a partner represent-
ing a partnership comprised of Ivan Carlson, Lyn Kimball and this 
Appellant. All defendants were served with a copy of the 
Complaint and Summons on or about June 11, 1982. On the 1st day 
of July, 1982, an answer signed by all named defendants was 
filed with the court. (TR: 13) This answer was not prepared by 
an attorney and did not designate that the defendants were acting 
pro se. 
On the 17th day of September, 198 2, Respondent's attorney 
moved to strike the aforementioned answer that had been filed on 
July 1, 1982, in that the answer was a sham and false and failed 
to comply with Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(TR: 15) The Court never acted upon Respondent's motion. 
On the 7th day of January, 1983, an answer was filed by 
Thomas Taylor, designating himself and the firm of Christensen, 
Taylor and Moody as attorneys for defendants. (TR: 26) There-
after notice of all proceedings were sent to Thomas Taylor, as 
attorney for defendants. 
On September 17, 1982, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (TR: 17) A copy of this motion apparently was never 
sent to the Defendants, including this Appellant. On November 
29, 1982, a Notice to Submit Matter for Decision was mailed to 
all Defendants. On December 17, 1982, Judge Sam granted 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. On December 30, 1982, 
Respondent's attorney advised the Court of the error in not 
sending a copy of the motion to all named defendants. Judge Sam, 
at the hearing, held on the matter on December 30, 1982, granted 
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Defendants 10 days within which to file a responsive pleading. 
The earlier Motion for Summary Judgment was set aside on the 12th 
day of January, 198 3. This Respondent then filed a Notice to 
Submit Matter for Decision on Respondent's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Court never ruled on Respondent's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
The matter came on for trial on May 24, 1984. After 
consideration of all of the evidence, and having been equally 
advised, the Honorable Judge Sam entered a memorandum decision 
awarding judgment for this Respondent based upon findings of fact 
and conclusions of law as contained in the appendix to 
Respondent's brief. 
At trial, Appellant improperly sought to speak out during 
attorney Hill's questioning of a witness questioning and was told 
by Judge Sam to be quiet. 
On February 27, 1985, Appellant filed motions to dismiss all 
prior actions, to set aside judgment as to Defendant Garry Smith 
and for retrial. By Minute Entry dated March 21, 1985, Judge Sam 
denied Appellant's motions. Judge Sam noted that Appellant had 
filed his motions in an untimely manner, but allowed Appellant 30 
days within which to perfect an appeal. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Respondent has found it difficult to frame arguments under 
what this Respondent believes to be the proper legal issue 
brought forth by this case on appeal, and still have the proper 
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arguments relate to those put forth by Appellant. Nevertheless, 
Respondent will argue to each point enumerated in Appellant's 
brief. 
Point I. Respondent shall argue that any lack of notice to 
Appellant under Rule 5(a) has not been to Appellant's detriment 
in that Appellant received notice of all motions acted upon by 
the Court. 
Point II. Appellant was properly represented during all 
stages of the proceedings by attorney Thomas Taylor. 
Point III. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial 
court in denying Appellantfs motions. Rule 59 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure states those reasons upon which a decision may 
be made to grant a new trial. None of the reasons for a new 
trial is applicable to the case on appeal. 
Point IV. No fraud has been committed by Respondent or his 
attorney. Appellant apparently does not understand the legal 
meaning of fraud nor the intent of Rule 9(c) of the Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
Respondent's Failure to Comply with Rule 5fa) 
is not Sufficient Grounds for a New Trial 
When the Trial Court Did Not Act Upon any Motion 
to the Disadvantage or Detriment of Appellant. 
Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Answer to Complaint. A 
copy of this motion was not sent to Appellant. The Court did not 
act upon this motion. 
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Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. A copy of 
this motion was not mailed to Appellant. Appellant notes in his 
brief that the court set aside its ruling awarding Respondent 
summary judgment. 
On or about March 6, 1985, Appellant's co-defendant in the 
trial below, Lyn Kimball, filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment as 
to Defendant Kimball. Respondent filed an objection to the 
motion with accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities. A 
copy of the objection and memorandum were sent to Appellant on 
May 22, 1985. This motion was never acted upon by the Court. A 
Stipulation has been filed with the trial court to set aside 
judgment as to Lyn Kimball. 
Appellant seems to be alleging that he was not given a fair 
trial because he did not receive copies of motions that have not 
been acted upon by the Court. Inasmuch as Appellant has not been 
disadvantaged by the failure of notice, there is no basis upon 
which the trial court should have granted a new trial. 
II. 
Appearance by an Attorney Creates a Presumption 
that a Party is Represented by Counsel. 
In the case on appeal, attorney Thomas Taylor filed an 
Answer with the trial court designating himself and the law firm 
of Christensen, Taylor and Moody as attorneys for the 
Defendants. Mr. Taylor further represented the interests of all 
named Defendants at a pre-trial conference on May 4, 1984, and at 
trial on May 24, 1984. These actions created a presumption that 
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all Defendants in this action were represented by attorney 
Taylor. 
The Utah Supreme Court has clearly stated in Blake v. Blake, 
412 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah 1966) that whenever service upon a party 
is required or permitted and such party is represented by an 
attorney, the service shall be upon the attorney. In Blake the 
party's attorney filed a motion on his clients behalf. As a 
result of the attorney's appearance, the Court went on to hold 
that such appearance is presumptive evidence that an attorney is 
authorized to represent the person for whom he appears in the 
action. 
In the case on appeal, Mr. Taylor filed an answer on 
Appellant's behalf. This action created a presumption that 
Mr. Taylor represented the Appellant and had the authority to 
receive service for his clients. 
The general rule stated in 7 Am. Jur., 2d Attorney and 
Client, Section 145, is as follows: 
The presumption in favor of the authority of an 
attorney to appear in a lawsuit can be overcome 
only by clear, satisfactory, and convincing proof, 
or at least, by a clear preponderance of the 
evidence. 
Appellant argues at this late point in time that Mr. Taylor 
was not his counsel, yet Appellant allowed Mr. Taylor to file an 
answer on his behalf and represent him at trial without objec-
tion. As of June 28, 1985, Thomas Taylor has not filed a Notice 
of Withdrawal of Counsel. 
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III. 
The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion in 
Denying Appellant's Motions for a New Trial 
Where Appellant Presented No Valid 
Grounds for a New Trial. 
Rule 59(a) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a new 
trial may be granted for any of the following causes: 
1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, 
or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial; 
2) Misconduct of the jury; . . . 
3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against; 
4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which he could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at trial; 
5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice; 
6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that is against the 
law; 
7) Error in law. 
As to subdivision (1) above, it has previously been argued 
in this brief that Appellant was represented by counsel through-
out all stages of the proceeding and that no action was taken by 
this Court against Appellant upon any pleading or Motion without 
adequate notice to Appellant's counsel. 
Subdivision (2) above is inapplicable to this case on 
appeal. 
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As to subdivision (3) above, Appellant has not alleged any 
accident nor has he alleged any surprise which ordinary prudence 
could not have guarded against. Thomas Taylor, counsel for 
Appellant, was given proper notice as to all motions, hearings 
and judgments. Appellant appeared at trial and did not notify 
the Court that he had not received proper notice of the trial, or 
that he was not being represented by attorney Taylor. Appellant 
had ample opportunity to inform the Court of any accident or 
surprise, yet he totally failed to do so. 
As to subdivision (4), Appellant alleged in his "Memorandum 
in Refutation of Plaintiff's Facts" (TR:88) that he has addi-
tional evidence that was not introduced at trial, yet Appellant 
has failed to meet the test for a new trial based on new evidence 
as articulated by Justice Durham in Doty v. Town of Cedar Hills, 
656 P.2d 993, 995 (Utah 1982), wherein the court held: 
To be entitled to an amended judgment or a new 
trial based on newly discovered evidence, the 
defendant must show that: 
a) There is material competent evidence which is 
in fact newly discovered; b) by due diligence the 
evidence could not have been discovered and 
produced at trial; and c) the evidence must not be 
merely cumulative or incidental but must be 
of sufficient substance that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that with it there would have been a 
different result. 
It appears that the evidence Appellant wants to introduce 
was either in his possession or was such that he could have 
easily obtained it prior to trial. There is no indication that 
the additional evidence would have made any difference in the 
outcome of the case. 
8 
As to subdivision (5) above, Appellant has not alleged that 
the damages were excessive. 
As to subdivision (6) above, Appellant has not alleged that 
the evidence was insufficient or that the court's judgment was 
against the weight of the evidence, only that he has additional 
evidence that should have been presented at trial. Appellant may 
not at this late date, argue that he has evidence that could 
reasonably have been obtained for trial. 
As to subdivision (7) above, Appellant has not alleged that 
there was an error in the law applied by the Court in this case 
on appeal. Certainly case law makes it clear that the corporate 
veil may be pierced and that the Appellant in the case on appeal 
may be held individually liable. (See Plaintiff's Trial 
Memorandum. TR:37) 
IV. 
No Fraud has been Committed by Respondent's Attorney. 
Appellant argues as a basis for appeal that fraud has been 
committed. Appellant has referred to Rule 9(C) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Respondent believes this Appellant may have 
been referring to Rule 9(b) which states: 
FRAUD, MISTAKE, CONDITION of the MIND. In all 
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances 
constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with 
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge, and 
other condition of mind of a person may be averred 
generally. 
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This Rule refers to the necessity of pleading fraud with 
particularity and appears to have little bearing on Appellant's 
allegation that Respondent's attorney committed fraud. 
Respondent's attorney inadvertently failed to mail a copy of 
two motions to Appellant. Neither of these motions was acted 
upon by the trial court to Appellant's detriment or disadvantage. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Appellant's motions for a new trial where Appellant was repre-
sented by an attorney and was present at trial. There are no 
grounds under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure upon 
which Appellant should be granted a new trial. 
RESPECTIVELY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of July, 1985. 
By: /^•^riy7/l^^0^ 
RICHARD L. HILL 
Attorney for Respondent 
/ and Plaintiff 
/L 
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